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Abstract
Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause
trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with
others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This
paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles.
Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets
of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the
notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature.
It then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in
epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for
the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists.
1 Introduction
People interact with evidence in different ways. Evidence that persuades you might
leave others cold or lead them to strengthen their views. What indicates nefarious
intentions to one person suggests bumbling incompetence to another. Where one
person briskly rules out alternative explanations, another keeps them alive, refusing
to make up their mind.
This variation in ways of interacting with evidence compromises our ability to
understand one another. And it poses problems for rational engagement, endangering
democratic practices of collective deliberation. This makes it important to address why
people interact with evidence in different ways.
In this paper, I discuss a neglected ingredient behind how people interact with
evidence, one which plays a crucial role in explaining systematic differences in modes
of epistemic engagement: epistemic style. Though the notion of epistemic style has
remained under-theorized, the phenomenon is familiar. It is exemplified in the charge
that American politics has come to be dominated by the “ paranoid style,” which
expresses “heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy” (Hofstadter
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2012). Epistemic styles are also at play in the distinctive ways of interacting with
evidence that some intellectual communities—such as Black feminists or the self-
described rationalists—seek to articulate and inculcate.
I analyze epistemic styles as unified ways of interacting with evidence which
express a cohesive set of epistemic parameters, and which agents can put on and take
off. I argue that differences in epistemic style are at play in paradigmatic cases of
systematic differences in how people interact with evidence.
This goes against standard views in the literature, which tend to account for such
differences in two ways: either by appealing to epistemic virtues, vices or other
deep character traits (in virtue-theoretic approaches), or by appealing to the effect
of irrelevant contextual factors (according to situationists). Unlike virtue-theoretic
approaches, my view does not impute deep, long-standing character traits to agents
to explain their ways of interacting with evidence. For this reason, the view avoids
concerns about the existence and explanatory power of such robust traits in ordinary
agents. At the same time, unlike situationist approaches, my view does not portray
agents as passive conduits for their context: their interactions with evidence remain
the result of epistemic parameters of their own. For this reason, my account helps us
address the long-standing debate between virtue theorists and situationists.
Further, this account of the ways in which agents interact with evidence provides
us with tools for understanding others qua epistemic agents and for designing more
effective strategies for rational engagement. And, because we can only begin to
properly assess our interactions with evidence once we are clear on their roots, it
functions as a prolegomenon to a novel approach to central questions about how to
epistemically assess interactions with evidence.
The plan for the paper is as follows. In §2, I articulate and motivate the central
question of the paper and key desiderata for a good answer. In doing so, I argue that
existing approaches to how people interact with evidence are insufficient. In §3, I
develop my analysis of epistemic styles. In §4, I employ the notion of epistemic styles
to put forward my explanation of why epistemic agents vary in how they interact with
evidence, and show how this explanation meets the desiderata outlined in §2. Finally,
in §5, I sketch implications of thinking of epistemic behavior in terms of epistemic
styles for epistemology.
2 The VariationQuestion
Different people—and the same person in different contexts—interact with evidence in
different ways. They update their attitudes differently in light of the same evidence,
differ in the beliefs on which they take evidence to bear, explore different explanations
for evidence, assess sources differently, and so on. And they inquire in varied ways
in the same epistemic situation, differing in how they gather evidence, ask questions,
and generate explanations. This raises the following question:
The Variation Question: Why is there inter- and intra-personal varia-
tion in ways of interacting with evidence?
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This is a descriptive question: it asks for an explanation of people’s interactions
with evidence. We can offer such an explanation without presupposing that those
interactions are rational. I will, in my discussion, remain as neutral as possible on
which ways of interacting with evidence are rational.1 At the same time, the answer
to the Variation Question has normative implications. Properly understanding what is
going on at a cognitive level when people interact with evidence matters for assessing
those interactions. I will discuss normative implications of my answer to the Variation
Question at the end of this paper.
A central reason to be interested in the Variation Question comes from the social
and political significance of the fact that people interact with evidence in different
ways. First, this diversity makes trouble for mutual understanding. Encountering
a person who interacts with evidence in ways that radically diverge from our own
can be disconcerting, generating a sense of distance and alienation. Why would
someone act like that? What could they possibly be thinking? This can easily lead to
thinking that it is not worth engaging. And, when we engage less with others, the
chances for understanding diminish. The result is a vicious loop where the prospects
for mutual understanding continually thin down, and where mutual alienation and
distrust continually poison the social waters.
This has important political consequences. As political scientist Michael Morrell
notes, without mutual understanding,
it is highly unlikely that citizens will demonstrate the toleration, mutual
respect, reciprocity, and openness toward others vital for deliberative
democracy to fulfil its promise of equal consideration that is central to
giving collective decisions their legitimacy. (Morrell 2010, 114–5)
In addition to posing problems for understanding, variation in ways of interacting with
evidence poses problems for rational engagement. Without knowing how an agent
will respond to evidence, how do you select evidence that will help you productively
engage? Without a realistic shot at rationally engaging, the scope for joint deliberation
becomes highly limited. This is a problem for democracy, which normatively relies
on rationally persuading others and (on popular accounts) on collective deliberation
(Dryzek 2002, Estlund 2009, Landemore 2017).
These problems motivate the need for an answer to the Variation Question. And
they constrain the shape that such an answer should take: we want an account that
can help us begin to address the issues I have just outlined. Such an account should
meet the following two desiderata:
Prediction Desideratum: To put us in a position to predict how others
will interact with a range of evidence.
Understanding Desideratum: To put us in a position to understand
others’ interactions with evidence.
1. There is a substantial literature on this question, more specifically, on which doxastic adjustments
in response to evidence are rational. On the side of ‘there is precisely one rational adjustment’ (the
uniqueness thesis), see White 2013, Dogramaci and Horowitz 2016, Schultheis 2018. On the permissivist
side, according to which there can be more than one rational response to evidence, see Douven 2009,
Kelly 2013, Willard-Kyle 2017, Callahan forthcoming.
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Ideally, an answer to the Variation Question should help us predict how others will
interact with evidence so that we can better select strategies for rational engagement.
And it should help us understand—make rational sense of—why others interact with
evidence in the ways they do.
These are only two of the desiderata that an answer to the Variation Question
should meet. To outline a few more, I will now consider candidate answers to the
question and why they fail.
An initially attractive idea is that the answer to the Variation Question is simple:
modulo performance mistakes, people interact with evidence differently because they
have different beliefs about the topic under discussion. If two epistemic agents interact
with evidence differently, it is either because some of their beliefs about the topic at
hand differ or because at least one of them made a reasoning mistake.
This view follows from (but does not require) two popular assumptions: (a) there
is only one way to reason rationally once we fix beliefs and evidence (White 2013,
Dogramaci and Horowitz 2016, Schultheis 2018) and (b) modulo performance mistakes,
all epistemic agents reason rationally (e.g. Davidson 1985, Dennett 1981, Lewis 1974,
Stalnaker 1984). It also fits with a natural construal of Bayesianism about human
reasoning (Clark 2013, Friston 2012, Oaksford et al. 2007, Tenenbaum et al. 2011).
Bayesians think that (modulo performance mistakes) everyone reasons according to
Bayes theorem. If we fix beliefs and evidence, then there is a unique response to
evidence: the one that Bayes’ theorem yields.2
Indeed, there are many cases where differences in beliefs about the topic or perfor-
mance mistakes fully explain differences in interactions with evidence. For example, if
two people look at a restaurant bill and come to different beliefs about how to split
it, this is likely the result of a performance mistake or of different beliefs about who
should pay for what. But not all cases fit this simple model.
My focus is on explaining what is going on in cases that do not fit this model. Such
cases are commonplace. For one, subjects often set different evidential thresholds for
revising their beliefs: whereas one person might change their mind on 𝑝 given very
little counter-evidence, another might require a large quantity of counter-evidence to
do so. As an example, gritty people set high evidential thresholds for abandoning the
belief that they are likely to succeed (Paul and Morton 2018), meaning that it takes a
lot of good evidence to persuade them that they are not likely to succeed. Defeatists
do the opposite, taking even the smallest setback to show that they are doomed.
More generally, two agents starting from the same beliefs about the topic under
discussion and the same evidence might nonetheless set different evidential thresholds
on the same topics.3 The gritty person and the defeatist might both start with the same
belief that they are likely to succeed, and the same beliefs about what factors contribute
to success, and still set different evidential thresholds.4 As a consequence, one of them
2. This requires claiming that the likelihood function is encoded in beliefs. If one rejects this assumption,
the view I will put forward is compatible with Bayesianism. To anticipate, Bayesians can see agents’
epistemic styles as fixing likelihood functions.
3. I am not making any claims about the epistemic permissibility of setting different evidential thresholds.
4. One might object that differences in evidential thresholds must ultimately reduce either to performance
mistakes or to differences in belief. Indeed, Paul and Morton (2018) hold that evidential policies are
“implicit attitudes or guidelines” (Paul and Morton 2018, 191), which one can plausibly construe as beliefs.
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might revise beliefs that the other does not in the light of the same evidence. In that
respect, at least, they will interact with the evidence differently.
To accommodate the significance of differences in evidential thresholds, any answer
to the Variation Question should meet the following desideratum:
Epistemic Parameters Desideratum: To account for the fact that at
least some differences in interactions with evidence are the result of
differences in epistemic parameter settings.
A natural suggestion in light of the discussion above is that we can explain differences
in how individuals interact with evidence in terms of a specific epistemic parameter:
evidential thresholds across one’s belief set (one’s evidential policy).
However, there are causally relevant epistemic parameters beyond evidential poli-
cies. For example, agents differ in how much they value getting truth over avoiding
falsehood (James 1979): if given the choice between acquiring 101 true beliefs and 100
false beliefs or acquiring no new beliefs, some agents will prefer the former and some
the latter. People weigh theoretical values differently: the Quinean with a preference
for desert landscapes will opt for a theory with few postulates, whereas the maximalist
will prefer a complex theory that fits more data. As a result, they will come to different
beliefs based on the same evidence. Further, agents find the same evidence compelling
to different extents. For example, some people are unlikely to change their mind based
on first-hand testimony, but find statistical surveys highly persuasive, whereas others
have the opposite preference.
On top of this, it is unlikely that a single parameter can explain differences in all be-
havior under the “interacting with evidence’’ umbrella. For instance, evidential thresh-
olds cannot. By themselves, they cannot explain differences in evidence-gathering,
in alternative explanations generated, or in questions asked about the evidence. In
fact, appealing to evidential thresholds does not yield a complete explanation even
in the cases in which theorists appeal to them. For example, gritty people do not just
require more evidence to change their minds on their chances of success. In addition
to that, they often also robustly explain away counter-evidence to those beliefs; shape
their trust policies in ways that allow them to devalue the testimony of people who
do not believe in them; and focus their attention on signs of success. These aspects of
behavior are not explained by evidential threshold settings.
To capture these facts, an answer to the VariationQuestion must meet the following
desideratum:
However, even if epistemic parameter settings are all ultimately reducible to beliefs—an open question—
the view we end up with by accommodating epistemic parameter settings in our model is very different
from the naive view above. The view now is now that differences in interactions with evidence reduce
to differences in (a) beliefs on the topic at hand, (b) performance mistakes, and (c) (probably implicit)
beliefs about how to interact with evidence. Factor (c) is not in the naive view. Further, more research
is needed to determine whether evidential threshold settings are implemented or determined beliefs:
this would require, for example, determining whether one’s evidential threshold settings are sensitive to
evidence in a belief-like way and interact with desires in a belief-like way. We are better off focusing on
the role of epistemic parameter settings in how agents interact with evidence, and leaving the question of
implementation for later.
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Multi-Dimensionality Desideratum: To account for variations in mul-
tiple dimensions of interacting with evidence and multiple epistemic
parameters.
In other words, a full answer to the Variation Question requires accommodating
variation in complex sets of epistemic parameters, and how they affect a broad range
of behavior.
This might suggest appealing to differences in deep epistemic character—in epis-
temic virtues, vices, and global character traits (Zagzebski 1996) (e.g. open-mindedness,
intellectual humility, arrogance)—to explain why people interact with evidence dif-
ferently. Such a account seems promising for meeting the Multi-Dimensionality
Desideratum because that global character traits are multi-track dispositions (Ryle
1949), i.e., they correspond to more than one pair of stimulus condition and manifesta-
tion. For this reason, they encompass settings in multiple epistemic parameters and
are well-placed to explain a wide range of epistemic behavior.
However, such virtue-theoretic approaches face a substantive empirical challenge:
the challenge from situationism (Harman 1999, Doris 2002, Alfano 2013, Fairweather
and Alfano 2017). Having a global character trait requires robustly manifesting that
trait across a wide range of conditions, not only in a narrow, hyper-specific range
of conditions. For example, honesty requires reliably behaving in honest ways, not
just behaving honestly when it’s sunny and you’ve had a nice meal. But results in
social psychology suggest that people do not robustly behave in trait-manifesting
ways. Instead, normatively irrelevant situational influences—e.g. moderate social
pressure, mood, framing—have substantial effects on behavior. As a consequence,
global character traits (which, by definition, are robustly manifested across a wide
range of conditions) are rare.
If the situationist is right, global character traits are not well-suited for addressing
typical cases of variation in how people interact with evidence. More generally,
situationism indicates that we need to leave space for the effect of contextual factors
on epistemic behavior:
Context-Dependence Desideratum: To accommodate the systematic
dependence of our ways of interacting with evidence on context.
For instance, we need to leave space for the fact that we interact with evidence
differently in different social contexts (e.g. in a philosophy seminar vs. at a bar
with non-academic friends). We should also accommodate our tendency to reason
in different ways when in a good mood and when feeling down (in exploratory vs.
critical ways, respectively; Schaller and Cialdini (1990)). Similarly, we should make
space for the fact that taking up accuracy goals as opposed to wanting to defend one’s
cherished beliefs affects the ways in which we interact with evidence (Kunda 1990).
At the same time, merely appealing to situational factors to explain epistemic behavior
seems insufficient. In particular, different agents respond to situational factors in
different ways, suggesting that we need to leave room for the agent in our explanations
of epistemic behavior.
The discussion so far points to a gap in our theorizing. Existing theoretical tools—
beliefs about the topic under discussion, performance mistakes, evidential threshold
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settings, deep character traits, situational factors—do not suffice to explain important
instances of variation in interactions with evidence. In the rest of the paper, I will
address this gap by introducing and developing an account of epistemic styles.
3 Epistemic Styles
3.1 Style: an overview
The notion of style has its primary home in aesthetics.5 In one canonical use of the
term, a style is a unified way of doing things: of dressing, gesturing, speaking, moving,
and so on. Taking up a style is a matter of being disposed to do things in those ways.
This is a descriptive notion of style, in that, on this notion of style, not all styles are
(aesthetically) good. You can have a style without being stylish: you just need to have
some unified way of doing things.6
Style shows up across a wide range of activities and domains: a flamboyant style can
show up in flashy, glittery outfits, in pronounced facial expressions, and in throwing
exuberant parties. At the same time, style is manifested in different ways across
activities and domains. A flamboyant style will result in different outfits at a dance
party and at a picnic, at least if one is sensitive to social norms.
When we talk of someone having a style, we mean that they do a number of things
in the same way. As Arthur Danto notes, the notion of consistency at play here is not
“formal” consistency:
It is the consistency rather of the sort we invoke when we say that a rug
does not fit with the other furnishings of the room, or a dish does not fit
with the structure of a meal, or a man does not fit with his own crowd
(Danto 1981, 207).
We cannot describe a style in a purely formalway, by listing abstract rules for combining
different constituents (e.g. different items of clothing). Instead, the orthodox view is
that what makes it the case that different actions are in the same style is that they are
all done in ways that express (aspects of) the same psychological profile (Robinson
1985, Wollheim 1987). Behavior that is in a certain style shows or makes manifest
(Green 2016) aspects of a unified psychological profile that the agent inhabits at the
time. Actions such as dressing for a picnic or for a party, talking in a certain tone of
voice, or characteristic gestures are in the same style in virtue of expressing the same
psychological profile.
Note, however, that style is not fixed. People can and do shift styles, both over the
course of their lives and across contexts. One’s style does not express deep character,
conceived as a set of stable, long-standing traits.7 Having a style only requires having
dispositions that are manifested in the contexts in which the person adopts the style,
and inhabiting the corresponding psychological profile in those contexts. For example,
5. For classic discussions, see Sontag 1966, Danto 1981, Baxandall 1985, Robinson 1985, Wollheim 1987.
6. As Riggle (2015) notes, there is also an evaluative notion of style on which style is an achievement. It is
in this evaluative sense that some people are stylish and some people are not.
7. Thanks to Elisabeth Camp and Thi Nguyen for illuminating discussion on this point.
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someone who has a flamboyant style in their social but not professional life has the
corresponding psychological features—a preference for the dramatic, a tendency for
effusive displays of emotion, and a taste for boundary-pushing—in social contexts, but
does not have them in professional contexts.8
To summarize this large literature, styles are ways of doing things, and taking
up a style is a matter of having dispositions to do things in those ways. Styles are
unified, with their unity deriving from the fact that they express aspects of the same
psychological profile. Consequently, taking up a style involves contextually inhabiting
that psychological profile.
Though the notion of style has its home in aesthetics, it has been put to use
in explanatory projects in other domains. For example, linguists and philosophers
of language have theorized at length about styles of linguistic expression and their
social significance (Eckert 1989, Tannen et al. 2005), and feminist theorists have long
encouraged us to attend to distinctive gendered “ways of knowing’’ (Belenky et al. 1986,
Collins 2002, Gilligan 1993, Rooney 1991). Closer to my project here, philosophers of
mind and action have provided detailed accounts of style in intuitive cognition and
action. Elisabeth Camp articulates perspectives as styles of intuitive thinking: packages
of intuitive dispositions to notice, explain, and evaluate the world around us (Camp
2006, Camp 2013, Camp 2019, Camp 2020). And Thi Nguyen (2020b) has developed the
notion of modes (or styles) of agency, focused ways of being an epistemic agent that
agents adopt in context-dependent ways.
These projects illustrate the explanatory power of the notion of style. For example,
thinking about perspectives helps us understand the cognitive significance of linguistic
devices such as slurs (Camp 2013) and metaphors (Camp 2006), the role of models in
scientific inquiry (Camp 2020), and the structure of testimony (Fraser 2021). Modes
of agency help explain our engagement with games and make-believe, how we shift
values in the context of different activities, and the development of agency over time
(Nguyen 2020b). Such explanations also raise new normative questions about which
perspectives and modes of agency we ought to adopt. Similarly, I will show that
epistemic styles help us better understand a wide range of epistemic behavior and
raise new normative questions about which epistemic styles we ought to adopt.
3.2 Style in an epistemic key
Applying the points in the last sub-section to the epistemic domain, here is my defini-
tion of epistemic style:
Epistemic Style: An epistemic style is a way of interacting with evidence
that expresses (aspects of) a unified set of epistemic parameters.
Taking up an epistemic style is a matter of having the dispositions that constitute that
epistemic style and setting epistemic parameters accordingly. Epistemic styles are
flexible: people can and do shift their style over time and across contexts, by re-setting
their epistemic parameters and adopting the corresponding epistemic dispositions.
8. For more on how personality is affected by context, see Goffman 1978 on social roles, Rovane 2019 on
ways of reasoning, Nguyen 2020b on modes of agency, and Morton 2014 on code-switching.
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It will be easier to get a grip on the notion of epistemic style by considering some
examples.
Consider, first, the paranoid style, introduced by Richard Hofstadter as a style for
“angry minds,” expressive of “heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial
fantasy” (Hofstadter 2012). Interacting with evidence in the paranoid style is a matter
of doing so in ways that express that psychological/epistemic profile. In recent work,
Rachel Fraser (2020) has further articulated the epistemic parameters expressed in the
paranoid style as involving “a coupling of Cartesian paranoia [“refusal to allow that the
evidence really guarantees what it appears to show”] with a very unCartesian passional
structure: epistemic fear of missing out, or FOMO” (Fraser 2020), characterized by
extreme epistemic risk-seeking.9
A second instructive example is the rationalist style, a way of interacting with evi-
dence that the self-proclaimed rationalist community strives to inculcate and promote.
This epistemic style is characterized by adhesion to Bayesian reasoning and by a “scout
mindset” (Galef 2021), rooted in curiosity and willingness to change one’s mind. It also
encompasses a tendency to contrarianism and openness to exploring views regard-
less of the moral costs of doing so. According to critics, it also involves intellectual
arrogance, manifested in deep trust of one’s judgments and unwillingness to defer to
others (Metz 2021). Rationalism is not just a set of epistemic commitments: it is meant
to be inhabited and made manifest in how agents actually interact with evidence. In
other words, the ideal rationalist not only endorses the epistemic commitments of the
movement, but also adopts the corresponding epistemic style, setting their epistemic
parameters so as to be disposed to reason according to Bayes’ theorem, seeking out
alternative explanations in a fairly unconstrained way, omnivorously consuming data
and statistics, responding to personal testimony with an attitude of skepticism, and so
on.
For a third example, consider the epistemic practices discussed by Patricia Hill
Collins (2002) as characteristic of Black feminists in the United States. Collins argues
that Black feminists typically take “lived experience as a criterion for credibility”
(Collins 2002, 258), preferring testimony from people with relevant experiences of
oppression over impersonal descriptions and testimony that is conveyed with emotion
over coldly expressed points. They are disposed to seek out and value a wide range
of distinctive perspectives. And they place a high value on dialogue, as opposed to
more combative ways of interacting, with “new knowledge claims…usually developed
through dialogues with other members of the community” (Collins 2002, 260). To put
it differently, taking up the Black feminist epistemic style involves having dispositions
to omnivorously seek out personal narratives from a range of different social positions,
to take seriously evidence provided in an emotionally invested way, and to change
one’s mind through dialogue.
These are just three examples of epistemic styles. There are many more. Any
unified way of interacting with evidence where the unity derives from the expression
of epistemic parameter settings is an epistemic style.
Epistemic styles are commonplace. In part, this is because having an epistemic
9. I am not committed to this analysis capturing all cases of the paranoid style. I am just employing this
analysis to articulate an example of an epistemic style. The same caveat applies to the two examples
below.
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style does not require having reflective epistemic commitments, and one’s style can
come apart from whatever reflective epistemic commitments one has. Epistemic style
does not express epistemic commitments: it expresses epistemic parameter settings.
These parameters include many features that epistemologists have discussed at length.
They include: Jamesian preferences for collecting true beliefs versus avoiding false
beliefs (James 1979); risk preferences with respect to epistemic goods (Buchak 2013);
and weightings of theoretical values (e.g. observational adequacy vs. fit with common
sense; Douven 2009, Kelly 2013, Willard-Kyle 2017). They also include evidential
policies, which collect the agent’s evidential thresholds for a range of beliefs (Paul and
Morton 2018), and trust policies, which set how one allocates epistemic trust in other
agents.
I do not mean this list of epistemic parameters to be exhaustive or definitive. The
point is that the kinds of aspects of psychology expressed in epistemic style are familiar
from epistemology. At the same time, though epistemologists have discussed all of
these parameters, they have failed to notice that they cluster into epistemic styles—
such as the paranoid, rationalist, and Black feminist styles.10 The epistemic behavior
of agents who have these styles is not well-understood in terms of isolated epistemic
parameters. To get a holistic sense of their behavior, we need to appeal to epistemic
styles. Specifically, as I will now show, appealing to epistemic styles to explain ways
of interacting with evidence meets all desiderata outlined in §2.
4 Answering the VariationQuestion
I set out to explain systematic differences in ways of interacting with evidence. I argued
in §2 that existing explanatory tools do not suffice. I will now argue that epistemic
styles do the job. Specifically, I will argue that: (a) when an individual systematically
interacts with evidence in different ways when placed in different contexts, this is
typically due to a shift in epistemic style; and, (b) when two people interact with
evidence in systematically different ways, a difference in epistemic styles is typically
part of the explanation.
This account leaves space for isolated epistemic parameters and global character
traits to play an explanatory role. Specifically, there are cases in which isolated
epistemic parameters explain the way in which an agent interacts with evidence. But,
given the kinds of inter-connected patterns of variation we encounter, these will be
marginal cases. Similarly, global epistemic character traits explain some patterns of
behavior. But, given the sensitivity of our epistemic behavior to situational factors,
such traits will be explanatory only in unusual cases.
I will now show that appealing to epistemic styles meets all desiderata I outlined
in §2.
10. I leave open what the source of this clustering is. In some cases, it is internal: plausibly, the epistemic
parameter settings of the paranoid style fit together because they all derive from a single psychological
trait, e.g. suspiciousness. In other cases, it may be external, coming from social groups coordinating
around packages of ways of interacting with evidence, as seems to be the case for the rationalist style.
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4.1 Meeting the Desiderata
I will start with the Epistemic Parameters, Multi-Dimensionality, and Context-
Dependence Desiderata. In doing so, I will argue that appealing to epistemic styles
is well-supported by empirical findings about how we interact with evidence. I will
then discuss how the view meets the Predictive Validity and Intelligibility Desiderata,
which will illuminate the practical and social benefits of the account.
Epistemic Parameters Desideratum: To account for the fact that at
least some differences in interactions with evidence are the result of
differences in epistemic parameter settings.
Epistemic styles express settings in (unified sets of) epistemic parameters. When differ-
ences in interactions with evidence are the result of differences in epistemic style, they
are also describable as the result of differences in epistemic parameter settings. For this
reason, appealing to epistemic styles satisfies the Epistemic Parameters Desideratum.
Multi-Dimensionality Desideratum: To account for variations in all
dimensions of interacting with evidence, and in multiple epistemic param-
eters.
Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence, where interacting with evidence
covers changing one’s beliefs in the light of evidence, gathering evidence, asking
questions, considering alternative explanations, and so on. For this reason, appealing
to epistemic styles can cover variations in all dimensions of interacting with evidence.
Further, epistemic styles express sets of epistemic parameters, not a single parameter.
Consequently, appealing to epistemic styles captures variations in multiple epistemic
parameters.
Context-Dependence Desideratum: To accommodate the systematic
dependence of our ways of interacting with evidence on context.
Unlike the global epistemic character traits of virtue epistemological approaches, an
agent’s epistemic style can change across contexts. For this reason, appealing to
epistemic styles can accommodate the context-dependence of our ways of interacting
with evidence. As such, it can take into account situationist results (discussed in §2).
Situationism, however, is primarily a negative view. In contrast, I provide a sys-
tematic framework in which to think of the role of situational factors, one which
leaves space for our cognitive agency. In this framework, the influence of situational
factors does not make agents empty vehicles through which context operates. Instead,
such factors lead agents to (epistemically) code-switch (Morton 2014). Contextual
factors shape and constrain which epistemic style agents take up.11 And epistemic
style expresses the agent’s epistemic parameter settings in that context. This leaves
space for agency in shaping interactions with evidence.12
The overall picture of the role of context is a fragmentationist one. Fragmentation-
ists about belief hold that different sets of beliefs (fragments) guide action in different
contexts, and appeal to this to explain cases of inter-context behavioral inconsistency.13
11. Such factors can also cause performance mistakes or, more generally, lead agents to act out of style.
12. Developing an account of the agency we have over our epistemic styles is beyond the scope of this paper.
13. See Lewis 1982, Egan 2008 and the essays in Borgoni et al. forthcoming for more on belief fragmentation.
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Similarly, different epistemic styles are activated in different contexts. This explains
differences in epistemic behavior across contexts.
For example, which epistemic style we take up is in general sensitive to that
of others around us. As Collins (2002) argues, many of the features of the Black
feminist epistemic style are derived from practices of interaction characteristic of
Black communities in the United States. Similarly, people often develop the paranoid
style as the result of immersion in conspiracist communities. And the rationalist style
is actively promoted and taught by the rationalist community, through textbooks,
workshops, and online community spaces.14
For a second example of how appeal to epistemic style captures the effects of
situational factors, consider the effects of mood. A positive mood tends to make us
more exploratory, and a negative mood more critical and detail-oriented (Schaller and
Cialdini 1990). This phenomenon is well-captured in terms of a shift in epistemic style.
Moods elicit distinctive epistemic styles: they lead us to re-set epistemic parameters
and to adopt corresponding dispositions. Similar remarks apply to the way in which
accuracy vs. defensiveness goals constrain how we interact with evidence (Kunda
1990).
In general, non-epistemic factors affect how we interact with evidence indirectly,
by triggering shifts in epistemic style. This leaves room for empirical investigation
the elicitation conditions for epistemic styles (i.e. the conditions in which a specific
epistemic style is elicited in an agent). And it suggests that fragmentationists about
belief need an additional variable in their theory: not just which beliefs are active, but
also which epistemic style is at play.
The fact that appealing to epistemic styles meets the Epistemic Parameters, Multi-
Dimensionality, and Context-Dependence desiderata shows that appealing to epistemic
styles is well-suited to describe our interactions with evidence. This makes it unsur-
prising that appeal to epistemic styles helps us predict how agents will interact with
evidence:
Predictive Validity Desideratum: To put us in a position to predict
how others will interact with a range of evidence, if we have relevant
information.
Knowing someone’s style, in general, helps us predict their (style-related) behavior.
It helps us predict how they will dress, speak, react to others, and so on, in contexts
in which they have that style. Similarly, knowing someone’s epistemic style helps
us predict how they will interact with evidence. Knowing someone’s epistemic style
involves knowing how they are disposed to interact with evidence in a context: which
evidence they are disposed to take seriously, which evidence is likely to change their
minds, which circumstances are likely to elicit evidence-gathering behavior, and so on.
If we know someone’s epistemic style in a context and their relevant beliefs, we are
14. The Center for Applied Rationality (https://www.rationality.org/) offers workshops, at $4,900 for four and
a half days. And there are a range of online manuals to this style, including Eliezer Yukowski’s Harry
Potter and the Methods of Rationality, and online spaces committed to this style of reasoning, such as the
online forum Less Wrong (https://www.lesswrong.com/), “a community blog devoted to refining the art
of rationality.”
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well-equipped to predict how they will respond to evidence in that context. For this
reason, the Epistemic Styles View meets the Predictive Validity Desideratum.
Such predictions are not infallible. Styles are usually compatible with multiple
responses to evidence. And dispositions are not always manifested in their elicitation
conditions. They can be masked (Johnston 1992, Bird 1998): much like a fragile glass
might fail to break when struck because it is carefully wrapped, a person with a
paranoid epistemic style might fail to come up with a conspiratorial explanation for
the evidence because they are too tired.
The fact that the view meets the Predictive Validity Desideratum is practically
significant. It provides tools for (at least partially) addressing the difficulties in rational
persuasion and joint deliberation I mentioned in §2. You can canvass your knowledge
of epistemic style to select evidence that your interlocutor will find persuasive, to
determine how much evidence to offer, and to anticipate and pre-empt objections to
your arguments that they are likely to bring up.
For example, if you are trying to persuade someone who interacts with evidence
in the paranoid style, you should expect them to find conspiratorial explanations
highly salient, to strongly prefer evidence from more informal sources than from the
mainstreammedia, and to set high evidential thresholds for changing their mind across
the board. Armed with this knowledge, you can select more persuasive evidence to
offer, anticipate alternative explanations for that evidence, and persevere in a way
that is sensitive to their high evidential thresholds. Alternatively, you might decide to
pass on seriously engaging until you are in a context where they will take up a more
receptive epistemic style.15
Knowledge of epistemic style makes a distinctive contribution here. If your inter-
locutor adopts the rationalist style, you would be practically well-served by offering
evidence from academic sources, expecting them to reason carefully through prob-
abilistic evidence and to be open to alternative explanations that may have morally
dubious implications, and so on.16
This leaves one final desideratum to address:
Understanding Desideratum: To put us in a position to understand
interactions with evidence.
Understanding comes in different kinds and degrees (Grimm 2016). My discussion
below cannot do justice to all varieties of understanding. That said, I will try to
make the case that knowledge of epistemic style contributes to important kinds of
understanding.
One kind of understanding—the kind of understanding characteristic of the natural
sciences—consists (roughly) in intellectually grasping a causal model of the factors
15. Thanks to Christopher Willard-Kyle for helpful discussion.
16. Of course, epistemic style is only one factor among many that contribute to successful persuasion.
For example, effective engagement will require attention to how evidence is presented (Tversky and
Kahneman 1981), not only to which evidence one presents. Further, I leave open important ethical
questions: how do we employ knowledge of epistemic style in respectful, non-manipulative ways? What
are moral constraints on using our knowledge of others’ epistemic style? My discussion here serves as a
prolegomenon to such questions. To address them, we first need to bring epistemic styles into clear focus.
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which lie behind the target’s behavior, in a way that allows for good predictions
(Kitcher 1989).
Knowing an agent’s epistemic style in a context is a matter of knowing how they are
disposed to interact with evidence. In itself, knowledge of dispositions does not yield
knowledge of the cognitive basis of these dispositions. At the same time, epistemic
styles express epistemic parameter settings. If one also comes to have a sense for these
parameter settings, one comes to this kind of understanding of how an agent interacts
with evidence. There is good reason to think that knowing someone’s style puts one
in a position to determine what the background epistemic parameter settings are. As
McGeer (2007) puts it, we are “inveterate mentalizers” (McGeer 2007, 137): we find it
natural to understand all sorts of behavior in psychological terms. Our knowledge of
an agent’s style tends to be accompanied by a sense of the psychological features that
those surface dispositions express. For this reason, knowledge of style typically puts
us in a position to achieve naturalistic understanding of others.
We often want to understand others in ways that go beyond such naturalist un-
derstanding. We want to understand others as agents who act for reasons, whose
behavior is rationally intelligible. As Grimm (2016) notes, such understanding requires
seeing others not (merely) as causal mechanisms. Such understanding is holistic. As
Iris Murdoch put it, when we understand other people,
we do not consider only their solutions to specifiable practical problems,
we consider something elusive which may be called their total vision of
life… in short, the configurations of their thought which show continually
in their reactions and conversation (Murdoch 1956, 39).
Knowing others’ epistemic styles can make a distinctive contribution to understanding
them in this rich humanistic sense. It involves having a sense of “the configurations
of their thought” which show in their interactions with evidence: in this case, of the
epistemic parameter settings that are expressed in how they interact with evidence.
In virtue of knowing someone’s epistemic style, we come to understand them qua
epistemic agents who (in that context, on that topic) live by certain epistemic values.17
This is a significant result. Grasp of epistemic style can rescue us from seeing
others as profoundly irrational, specifically, as agents whose epistemic behavior is
purely determined by irrelevant factors ( such as strong emotions, partisan affiliations,
or vicious motivation). By appeal to epistemic styles, we can acknowledge that such
factors can and do play a role in how people interact with evidence: but they do so by
reshaping their epistemic parameter settings. Crucially, we can make genuine sense of
their epistemic behavior in light of such settings.
Note that, on this view, one can make genuine sense of others’ epistemic behavior
without viewing them as epistemically rational. This goes against views that postulate
a constitutive connection between folk-psychological intelligibility and epistemic
rationality (Davidson 1973). On my view, we can see how a pattern of behavior
makes sense in the light of a set of epistemic parameters while thinking that setting
17. They may have long-standing values which are not manifested in the style they take up. Knowledge of
style will not help us make sense of their behavior by reference to those values. That is the right result
when those values are not in fact expressed in behavior.
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one’s epistemic parameters in those ways (in some, perhaps actual, contexts) leads to
irrational interactions with evidence. In other words, knowledge of epistemic style
enables us to make rational sense of epistemic behavior in light of specific parameter
settings, but this need not involve claiming that such behavior is rational.
The kind of understanding of others that I have discussed so far is distanced and
third-personal. It involves making sense of others’ responses to evidence intellectually,
by seeing how they express an epistemic profile. There are, however, more involved or
empathetic kinds of understanding of others that one may want to attain. Wemay want
to get others’ parameter settings “from the inside” by simulating them (Goldman 2006,
Maibom 2007), or to be able to see those parameter settings as good or choiceworthy
(Grimm 2016).
Such kinds of understanding appear especially socially and politically valuable,
because they reduce disdain for others and help resolve deep conflicts (Hannon 2020).
These benefits are particularly significant in political deliberation, which requires
tolerance, mutual respect, and openness towards others. Empathetic understanding
can function as an antidote to the kind of polarization (Benkler et al. 2018) that often
dominates political contexts, and thereby enable people to have better conversations
and reap the benefits of collective deliberation.
Merely knowing someone’s epistemic style does not suffice for empathetic under-
standing: achieving empathetic understanding requires additional imaginative and
perspectival work. Nevertheless, knowing someone’s epistemic style is an important
ingredient for this work. We need to have a sense of how others have set their epis-
temic parameters if we are to simulate them or come to see them as choiceworthy
from some perspective.
All things considered, appealing to epistemic styles meets the Understanding
Desideratum. Knowing someone’s epistemic style puts us in a position to begin to
understand the causal structure behind their interactions with evidence; it helps us
make sense of agents’ interactions with evidence at a personal level; and it provides
us with knowledge which we can canvass to arrive at empathetic understanding.18
5 Upshots of Epistemic Styles for Epistemology
I have argued that epistemic styles make a crucial contribution to how real-world
agents interact with evidence. Insofar as epistemologists are interested in providing
tools for assessing real-world epistemic agents, they have good reason to be interested
in epistemic styles.
In criticizing virtue epistemology, situationists press a similar point about the
importance of attending to how agents actually interact with evidence (Fairweather
and Alfano 2017). I go beyond the situationist critique in providing a new object
for epistemic assessment: epistemic styles. I have argued that individuals take up
epistemic styles, and that such styles are behind our interactions with evidence. If this
is right, then we can begin to build a more applicable theory of epistemic assessment
18. Much like the discussion of rational engagement above, this discussion of the understanding-related
benefits of sensitivity to epistemic style is only preliminary. When and to what extent sensitivity to
epistemic style has these benefits is a difficult empirical question.
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that improves on virtue epistemology by focusing on assessing epistemic styles instead
of global character traits.19 At a practical level, we should re-allocate our attention
from thinking about how to promote epistemic virtues to thinking about how to
inculcate good epistemic styles.20
Similarly, my discussion suggests that we need to expand our discussions of moral
and pragmatic encroachment.21 Such discussions tend to focus on how individuals
ought to shift isolated epistemic parameters—their evidential thresholds or spheres
of relevant alternatives—in the light of moral or practical factors.22 But moral and
pragmatic factors do not only affect how individuals set evidential thresholds or spheres
of relevant alternatives. They lead individuals to shift epistemic styles, adjusting a wide
range of epistemic parameters and behavior. To provide norms on encroachment, we
need to assess shifts in epistemic style, not only in isolated epistemic parameters.
Further, a theory of the epistemic assessment of epistemic styles may help us assess
epistemic conduct in cases of deep disagreement.23 An intriguing hypothesis is that
such disagreement is (at least in some cases) sustained by differences in epistemic style.
Where that is the case, assessing agents’ conduct will involve assessing their epistemic
styles and addressing questions about when one ought to change one’s epistemic style.
At the level of communal disagreement, epistemic styles might help us theorize
about epistemic bubbles and echo chambers (informational structures that omit or
actively exclude relevant information, respectively; see Nguyen 2020a). Perhaps some
such informational structures are partly sustained by divergences in epistemic style
at a community-level. If that is right, then dissolving these structures might require
community-level shifts in epistemic style. Theorists interested in these phenomena
should think through when shifts in epistemic style are appropriate and what are good
means to bring them about.
Finally, appeal to epistemic styles may also help us understand when and why
different ways of knowing (Belenky et al. 1986, Collins 2002, Gilligan 1993, Rooney 1991)
are valuable. Their value might in part be explainable in terms of the value of different
epistemic styles. One important benefit of approaching this question through the
lenses of epistemic style is that doing so avoids essentialism about modes of epistemic
engagement, that is, it avoids seeing such modes of engagement as innate or essential
to members of certain social groups. Epistemic styles are packages of dispositions
that one can take up and abandon, not innate or immutable traits of individuals. For
this reason, the claim that marginalized social groups have characteristic epistemic
styles is non-essentializing, leaving space to recognize the role of social factors in the
construction and adoption of epistemic styles.
19. See Lasonen-Aarnio (forthcoming) for an account of how to epistemically assess dispositions that is
relevant here, given that styles are packages of dispositions.
20. Thanks to Miranda Fricker for suggesting this point.
21. Thanks to Quill Kukla for suggesting this point.
22. See Bolinger (2020) for an overview of different kinds of encroachment proposed in the literature. Detailed
discussion of all versions of the encroachment view is beyond the scope of this paper.
23. See Frances and Matheson 2019 for an overview.
16
6 Conclusion
Why do we find diversity in how people interact with evidence? To address this
question, I introduced and developed the notion of epistemic styles: unified ways of
interacting with evidence that express (settings of) epistemic parameters which agents
can flexibly take up. I argued that appealing to differences in epistemic style best
accounts for cases of systematic variation in interactions with evidence.
Though I introduced the notion of epistemic style to address a descriptive question—
what explains people’s distinctive ways of interacting with evidence—the notion can
be put to work to reshape our normative theorizing. It can help us think through
important questions in epistemology—for example, about disagreement, cognitive
diversity, and echo chambers. More generally, epistemic styles provide a framework
within which to theorize about epistemic assessment.
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